China and Institution-Building in Competition with the West: Can Beijing Rewrite the Global Mediation Order? Commentary
u_652wzrp0kc / Pixabay
China and Institution-Building in Competition with the West: Can Beijing Rewrite the Global Mediation Order?

At a time when Western institutions continue to dominate the international legal stage, China has made a bold declaration of intent to offer an alternative narrative of global order by establishing a new mediation organization in Hong Kong. The International Organization for Mediation (IOMed)—with the participation of over 30 countries including Pakistan, Indonesia, Belarus, and Cuba—not only provides a platform for resolving disputes through non-judicial means, but also symbolizes Beijing’s ambition to become a major global mediator.

Until about a decade ago, China preferred to act as an observer in global politics. The well-known principle of Deng Xiaoping—”hide your strength and bide your time”—was the cornerstone of China’s international behavior. But today, from Afghanistan and Yemen to Iran, Palestine, and the Horn of Africa, China is taking on an increasingly mediatory role. This shift reflects Beijing’s growing global interests and its desire to be seen as a responsible and order-building power.

A prominent example of this transformation was China’s successful mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023—an agreement The New York Times described as “a geopolitical turning point for Xi Jinping’s ambitions.” Following that, China hosted Palestinian factions in July 2024, culminating in the “Beijing Declaration.” In the Horn of Africa, China introduced the “Outlook on Peace and Development” initiative to address the Tigray conflict in Ethiopia. It has even quietly mediated in lesser-known disputes, such as the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border clashes.

Analysts argue that IOMed represents an attempt to create a parallel legal order to traditional institutions such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), and leading arbitration centers like the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). With a focus on dialogue, mutual understanding, and an “Asian-neutral” approach, China aims to turn Hong Kong into a new hub for international arbitration—partly as a response to diminished global trust following the enactment of the National Security Law.

Geopolitically, IOMed serves a dual purpose: first, to resolve disputes related to the expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects; second, to present a model of diplomacy based on non-intervention, in contrast with Western approaches. It also constitutes a dimension of China’s broader rivalry with the US in the realm of soft power, a domain long dominated by the West.

However, China’s success in this endeavor is far from guaranteed. Western critics question Beijing’s impartiality—particularly its support for the Ethiopian government or its alignment with Russia in the Ukraine crisis. According to the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), “China is neutral in rhetoric but pursues its own interests in practice.”

In contrast, countries in the Global South see China’s approach as an effective alternative to Western-centric institutions. For many, China’s “non-colonial” diplomacy—which emphasizes mutual respect and joint development—is more attractive than Western interventionist models.

On a broader level, some experts, such as Kevin Rudd (former Australian prime minister and China scholar), argue that China is effectively writing an “alternative global agenda”—not based on liberal values, but grounded in economic realism and respect for national sovereignty.

At the same time, some analysts (e.g., Eurasia Review) warn that China’s focus on infrastructure-driven development, without accounting for local cultures and sensitivities, can become a source of conflict. Attacks on Chinese facilities in Ethiopia are cited as an example of such tensions.

Ultimately, IOMed should be seen as a mediation institution with Chinese characteristics. It is not merely an arbitration center; it is a component of China’s broader ambition to reshape soft power, create alternative mechanisms, and solidify its position as a pillar of the emerging global order. But can this “Chinese-style mediation” set a new international standard? The answer depends on the institution’s practical effectiveness, the level of trust it garners from involved countries, and the transparency of its mediation processes.

Beijing has opened a new arena—now the world must decide how far it is willing to play by its rules.

Dr. Sharareh Abdolhosseinzadeh holds a PhD in Political Science and is a Researcher at the Middle East Strategic Studies Center in Iran.

Opinions expressed in JURIST Commentary are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of JURIST's editors, staff, donors or the University of Pittsburgh.